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THE CONTEXT 
 
“BREXIT MEANS BREXIT” AND “OUT IS OUT”  
1. There will be a fundamental change in the UK’s relationship with the European Union (EU) 
2. The Reform Deal negotiated in February is off the table 
a) Agreements made redundant by UK exit:  
 Removal of ‘ever closer union’ from Treaties 
 Red card mechanisms for national parliaments to block EU legislation 
b) Agreements likely to be upheld regardless: 
 Restrictions on out of work benefits for newly arriving EU workers 
 Aim to reduce administrative burden of EU membership 
c) Agreements likely to have to be renegotiated: 
 Gradient of access to non-contributory in-work benefits for EU workers 
 Indexing social security benefits to country of residence of dependents 
d) Areas not agreed to that may be key targets for Brexit wishlist (as harder negotiating stance than Cameron’s):  
 Repatriation of social and employment law 
 No child benefit payments for non-resident dependents 
 Entitlement of EU workers who lose their jobs to unemployment benefit 
 No change to rules of internal market, including regulation of financial institutions 
3.  The UK and Republic of Ireland will no longer have shared status as EU member-states 
a) The UK/Ireland borders will have a new status for the EU itself as external borders 
b) A change to the status of UK/Ireland borders necessarily means and adjustment to north/south and east/west 
relations in these islands 
c) A change to the status of those relations (Strands 2 and Strands 3) has consequences for Strand 1 relations within 
Northern Ireland (unionist/nationalist) 
4. It is also important to bear in mind that the EU itself is also in flux 
a) Measures of change in relation to temporary border controls, immigration quotas, and the rise of the ‘security union’ 
increase motivation for change to the management of borders inside and external to the EU 
b) Rise of anti-EU parties within member-states and the connection made between concerns about immigration and 
terrorism means that member-state governments increasingly under pressure vis-a-vis national border controls 
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KEY POSITIONS & PRIORITIES 
1. European Level 
a) European Council 
 Separately, the heads of MS may wish to ensure a better trade deal for post-Exit UK than the Commission 
 At the same time, they will not be wishing to give ammunition to Eurosceptism within their own states. 
 ‘Hard’ border talk of EU is an effort to balance this.  “Europe needs to work out ways to achieve a more effective 
control on its external borders.” (President Tusk)1 
 
b) European Commission 
 No access to Single Market without Freedom of Movement 
 At same time, increasing security of external borders: “We will defend our borders with strict controls on everyone 
crossing them." (President Juncker)2 
 Importance of close ties with Britain on security and defence, and in counter-terrorism intelligence (Chief 
Negotiator, Michael Barnier) 
 
c) European Parliament 
 The fundamental freedoms are inseparable, no hierarchy between them (President Schulz and Chief Negotiator 
for the European Parliament, Guy Verhofstadt).3 
 Want UK out of EU by 2019 in time for new cycle of European Parliament elections and business.  
2. Governments 
a) British Government 
 Article 50 to be triggered by end March 2017. 
 Brexit mandate being interpreted as primarily about reducing immigration (thus border controls on persons) 
 Movement of goods/services/capital at risk of being sacrificed for constraint on movement of persons 
 Repeal Bill will see incorporation of EU law into domestic law with Ministerial power to select exceptions 
 Promise that devolved administrations will “have their say” but no veto 
 PM May, Sec of State Brokenshire, Minister David Davis have expressed support for an open Irish border.  
 
b) Irish Government 
 Concern to preserve ‘peace and prosperity’ in Northern Ireland is at front of their EU-facing position on Brexit 
 Preservation of Common Travel Area (CTA) is a priority 
 Concerns about criminal justice, immigration, policing and security arising from change to UK borders 
 Possibility of Irish unity by consent (i.e. change to the constitution of the UK) as enshrined in 1998 Good Friday 
(Belfast) Agreement (GFA) has also been raised as an important consideration. 
 An all-Ireland forum for ‘conversation’ on Brexit between parties, civil society to be held in November 2016. 
3. Regional level 
a) Northern Ireland Executive 
 Seeks full access to intergovernmental talks 
 Border to not be an impediment to movement of people, goods or services 
 Businesses must remain competitive (no additional costs), and have ease of access to EU member-states 
 Access to unskilled as well as highly skilled labour 
 Securing continued access to promised EU funds (13.5bn 1994-2014, 3.5bn 2014-2020) 
 Protecting interests of agri-food sector: CAP (10% UK CAP receipts go to NI) and barriers to trade on exports 
 Border related issues of crime, trade, employment, energy, most urgent 
 But fundamentally different positions on Brexit itself. 
o DUP: object to the supranational nature of the EU itself (especially power of the Commission), constraints on 
national sovereignty and the costs of the UK’s contributions to the EU’s budget. 
o Sinn Féin: concern to protect all-Ireland cooperation, the GFA (inc, potential border poll), human and 
employment rights, EU funding. Plus need for Government to respect majority Remain vote in N. Ireland. 
 
b) Northern Ireland Opposition 
 Jones Cassidy Brett solicitors are representing leaders of Alliance, Green Party, SDLP and SF’s John O’Dowd, 
plus figureheads from key civil society organisations in demand for a judicial review prior to triggering Article 50 
 UUP: NI wide enterprise zone, access to single market, preservation of CTA, no hard border 
 SDLP: ROI should support NI in Brexit negotiations, hard border completely unacceptable 
 Alliance: concern divisions in Executive will mean NI’s representation will reflect ‘lowest common denominator’ 
 Green Party: campaign most linked into wider UK and EU networks, members most pro-EU4 
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BRITISH/IRISH BORDER REGIMES 
 
THE ‘BORDER REGIME’   
 The implications of UK EU exit for UK/Ireland borders are not just about the territorial/maritime 
state boundaries but about the ‘border regimes’ of each state.  
 State borders are rarely non-traversable frontiers but every border that exists requires a specific ‘regime’ that 
controls or limits its crossing, and affects treatment within state jurisdiction.  
 The rules which determine the permeability of borders (of different types, e.g. for people and goods) are vital for 
state integrity and power regardless of the fact that globalization means that goods, services and capital are 
increasingly deterritorialised. 
 Border regimes are continually shifting, not just through EU or national law or bilateral agreements, but also 
because the means of crossing borders and of monitoring them through technology are also changing. 
 Border regimes imply not just inclusion/exclusion, but hierarchies of status within a jurisdiction.5  
 The status vis-à-vis border crossing depends most straightforwardly on the territory of origin (of goods, persons); 
more complicated border controls are in place when they require a judgement as to the merits and benefits to be 
brought via entry. 
 There can be concentric layers of border regimes; local, regional, national and supranational border regimes may 
differ in what they permit/include. These are summarised here in relation to: 
o Governance (institutions, structures, management, high level agreements) 
o Flows (particularly in relation to market integration, trade) 
o Citizenship (affecting freedom of movement, diversity, rights) 
o Security (particularly in relation to border controls and information sharing regarding travelers) 
 The strands of governance within these islands reflect different layers of border regimes, and it is worth 
considering how these overlap and diverge. These are: 
o Common border regime as part of the EU (affecting trade, citizenship, rights) 
o Special status of UK/Ireland border regime (affecting travel, immigration) 
o All-island border regime (in practice and principle, reflected in long-standing institutions) 
o Differential UK and Ireland border regimes 
o Differential NI status within the UK 
 
 
COMMON BORDER REGIME WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
EU membership means that the UK and Ireland have common regimes in relation to: 
1. Acquis communautaire (body of EU law inc. ECJ decisions, fundamental rights provisions) 
2. Single regulatory regime  
3. Directives with wider implications 
4. Regional and infrastructural development (including across borders) 
5. Participation in EU-wide policing and intelligence regimes (e.g. Europol) 
6. EU citizenship (Non-discrimination on the basis of nationality within the scope of EU Treaties) 
7. EU model and context 
 Formal structures for compromise-based agreements  
 Firmer grounds for bilateral relations (e.g. 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement “determination of both governments to 
develop close cooperation as partners in the European Community”) 
 
 
SPECIAL STATUS OF UK/IRELAND BORDER REGIME WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The UK and Ireland border regimes have a shared distinction from rest of the EU in relation to: 
1. Non-membership of the Schengen Area 
a) 26 European counties (including 4 EFTA states) with open borders between them 
b) Function for the purpose of travel as a single country, no permanent border controls, common visa policy 
c) Non-membership of the Schengen zone means that UK and Irish citizens can be subject to entry controls at 
Schengen borders 
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2. The Common Travel Area 
a) First established in 1923, the CTA is constituted of Ireland, the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man 
b) CTA has varied over time (e.g. checks on travelers between NI and GB maintained 1939-1952) 
c) The Area is treated as a common zone for immigration purposes; some variation in relation to Commonwealth 
citizens, non-EEA visitors. 
d) CTA does not amount to mirror treatment of British and Irish citizens in both jurisdictions, but does give preferential 
treatment compared with other EU citizens and others 
e) Border controls:  
 Varied among CTA members and across different types of borders (land/sea) 
 Identification requirements for UK and Ireland citizens vary between carriers (not set by state) 
 British concern about Northern Ireland as a backroute for migrants saw 2009 Government proposal to introduce 
checks between NI and GB (defeated by House of Lords) 
 2011 Agreement on joint standards for entry and enhanced electronic border systems to identify non-CTA 
travelers, plus exchange of information on travellers (e.g. biometric) as part of visa issuing process.6  
 
3. The British-Irish Agreement Act 1999 
a) British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
 Guarantees Irish government a say on bilateral interests on matters not devolved to NSMC or to NI 
 Standing Joint Secretariat of officials from the British and Irish governments dealing with non-devolved matters 
 Last met in February 2007; main significance is when devolution suspended7 
b) British-Irish Council 
 Membership includes representatives of both sovereign governments, devolved regions and crown 
dependencies.  
 Operates largely indirectly as a policy-transfer facilitator acting “to reach [non-binding] agreement on co-
operation on matters of mutual interest within the competence of relevant administrations”8 
 Meets biannually. Its work includes creating a common approach to EU issues and much of its remit includes 
topics that are affected by EU legislation and initiatives (e.g. agriculture, environment, tourism) 
 
 
ALL-ISLAND BORDER REGIME 
1. Governance 
a) North/South Ministerial Council 
 Primary intergovernmental mechanism for cross-border policy alignment  
 Discusses common approaches to policymaking in related to agriculture/rural development, education, the 
natural environment, healthcare, tourism, and transportation  
 Has served to align cross-border policy activities both directly and indirectly – effectively enhancing ‘all-island’ 
cooperation and borderlands integration within a limited set of policy arenas.  
 While this has created opportunities for increased integration in the past, the explicitly limited nature of these 
bilateral arrangements presents very little potential for increasing integration beyond the existing mandates.9 
b) Implementation bodies, inc. Special EU Programmes Body 
 The remits of these implementation bodies largely reflect the type of areas that are most affected by EU 
integration and cooperation 
 These agencies and commissions are co-funded by the three governments, and staffed by public servants from 
both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland – creating an unprecedented, if severely limited, cross-border 
organisation with both consultative and executive functions 
 
2. Flows 
a) Single Market 
 In the early years of EEC membership, this reduction of tariffs and access to the Single European Market (SEM) 
led to a brief export boom as Northern Ireland’s exports to both the south and to Europe expanded dramatically10 
 The removal of customs duties and protectionist policies finally eliminated the price distortions seen in many 
common consumer goods (tobacco, alcohol, etc.), reducing the profitability of smuggling operations that had 
continued across the physical border since its inception11 
b) Trade 
 2/3 of Northern Ireland’s sales to the EU are to the Republic of Ireland.12 
 The agri-food industry in NI particularly dependent on exports to the EU (Ireland). 
 Of Northern Ireland’s total sales in 2014 to the EU, 62.3% (worth £3,599 million) were to the Republic of Ireland 
alone, making it the single most important destination within the EU.13 
 Influx of external capital through inward investment after 1994 ceasefires brought a spurt of economic 
development to Ireland, though much of this ‘peace dividend’ was within Dublin-Belfast development corridor14 
British/Irish Border Regimes 
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3.  Citizenship 
a) All born on the island of Ireland are automatically entitled to Irish citizenship if either one of their parents was eligible 
for Irish citizenship. 
 2006 referendum and amendment to Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Constitution of Ireland) showed that 
immigration became more pressing national concern than unity of the island. 
b) Three times as many southern students in NI universities than northern students in ROI universities.  
 
4. Security 
 For the borderlands region, securitization of the border until 2002 further impinged market integration.  
 Good relationship between key agencies but effectiveness somewhat limited by unwillingness to cross border, 
different modes of practice, different focuses. 
 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UK AND IRELAND BORDER REGIMES 
1. Governance 
 Ireland has been and independent state since 1922 and left the Commonwealth in 1949.  
 Limited integration of the workings of political parties across jurisdictions, and those that are active across 
borders face some challenges in maintaining a consistent focus and approach in both jurisdictions. 
2. Flows 
 The UK’s non-membership of the Eurozone and different tax regimes mean that there is significant arbitrage 
across the UK/Ireland land border and there is also a persistent problem with smuggling.  
3. Citizenship 
 Although British and Irish citizens have special status in each jurisdiction (especially in NI), there are differences 
in the border regimes of the two states regarding citizenship and immigration (e.g. regarding Commonwealth 
citizens, non-EFTA citizens). 
 Differential for Irish citizenship by naturalization between those in the state’s jurisdiction and those in NI. 
4. Security 
 There are persistent concerns that there are gaps in coordination of security and policing across UK/Ireland 
borders that allow for blindspots and loopholes for criminal activities. 
 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BORDER REGIMES OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND GREAT BRITAIN  
1. Governance 
a) Devolution 
 Scotland has more devolved competences than Northern Ireland  
 Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions have been suspended and threatened with suspension on several 
occasions as a means of trying to force major political parties to cooperate within terms of 1998 Agreement. 
 
b) Consociationalism and conflict legacy 
 The devolution of legislative powers to Stormont accompanied a de facto veto system for both unionist and 
nationalist communities through the requirement for ‘parallel consent’ on pre-determined ‘key measures’.15  
 The cost of this stability and all-party buy-in has been that the current governance system is stymied by the 
bifurcated nationalist-unionist paradigm – a paradigm that remains antagonistic. 
 Cross-border policy integration hamstrung by partisan opposition – inc. tension between Sinn Féin and the DUP, 
averse to compromise (e.g. on education, language, and NI Bill of Rights) without external pressure.16 
 
c) 1998 Agreement 
 “All of the institutional and constitutional arrangements… are interlocking and interdependent and that in 
particular the functions of the (Northern Ireland) Assembly and the North/South Council are so closely inter-
related that the success of each depends on that of the other” 
 Technical links between NI Act and GFA to EU law.  
 Mechanisms for representing NI interests to the UK government, sharing perspectives with other devolved 
regions (Joint Ministerial Committee; BIC) and with Irish government (NSMC) are designed to find consensus.  
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2. Flows 
a) Structural fiscal vulnerability 
 NI constitutes 3% of UK population and 2% of its economic output. 
 Northern Ireland’s per capita deficit currently stands at more than twice that of the UK average17  
 Fiscal dependence on British government: the block grant constitutes 93% of NI budget. 
 Northern Ireland’s elevated fiscal deficit is compounded by its lack of control over revenue sources. It is 
vulnerable to reductions in fiscal transfers from the British exchequer, which is beyond its control. 
 This structural fiscal vulnerability directly and negatively impacts the sustainability of its public services, and most 
severely in remote, expensive-to-administer regions like the Irish borderlands. 
 Fiscal austerity and discretionary controls further limit the ability of Northern Ireland to reallocate resources in 
order to address regional idiosyncrasies.18 
 
b) Cross-border economic interests 
 Northern Ireland much more heavily dependent on trade with Republic of Ireland.19 
  
 
 
 Growth in sales to ROI much stronger than exports in general.20 
 
 
 
 Ability to set corporation tax that matches the Republic of Ireland was hard-won, representing rare cross-party 
agreement and reflecting a focus on southern model of economic development (which relies on access to Single 
European Market) 
 
c) Greater reliance on EU funding 
 EU funding represents around 8 percent of the region’s GDP.21  
 The region’s primarily agricultural economy remains heavily reliant on Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
subsidization.22 
 For every pound earned by Northern Irish farmers, 87 pence comes from the EU’S Single Farm Payment.23 
 Relies proportionately more on EU funding particularly in relation to agriculture and border region.  
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3. Citizenship 
a) A microcosm of close UK/Ireland relations 
 British and Irish citizenship can be claimed as easily and be of equal standing for residents in NI 
 One fifth of potential passport holders in NI are citizens of another EU state (Ireland) 
 4.5% of NI population born outside these islands (2% were born in Republic of Ireland, 6% born in GB) 
 
b) EU citizens 
 2.5% born in other EU member-states (2% in EU accession states)  
 Proportion of EU citizens: 2.2% NI (exc Irl/GB); 4.1% Eng/Wales, 8.7% Ireland (inc. the 2.5% British citizens) 
 
c) Complex national identities 
 Strong British-only identity and weak regional identity compared with Scotland  
 Irish and British identities have been conceived as not just binary but oppositional. EU membership and the GFA 
have been what changed that – not the CTA.   
 
 
 
4. Security 
 Topic of Brexit exacerbates divisions in Northern Ireland, and divides the NI Executive.  
 Socio-political and cultural context is one emerging from prolonged violent conflict and enduring continued threat 
of paramilitary violence and activity. 
 Territorially NI continues to be an outpost of the UK and Brexit brings this into sharper relief. 
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UK/IRELAND BORDER PRIORITIES 
 
THE BORDER REGION 
1. History 
 15% of the population of the island live in the 13 districts around the border. 
 Ireland’s pre-modern history illuminates the centrality of ‘core’ territory security, and control over territorially-
bound resource flows for bordering processes.  
 EEC/EU membership meant that policies developing market and governance links were implemented long before 
social normalization between communities was even a realistic proposition.  
2. Structural deficits of the border region 
a) Population 
 Ageing population 
 Lack of population growth 
 Low population density 
 
b) Economic 
 Concentration of extreme material deprivation in the District Electoral Divisions in closest proximity to the 
physical borderline24 
 Levels of local inter-firm co-operation across the border remain much lower than levels of inter-firm co-operation 
on the same side of the border.25 
 Elevated levels of unemployment, overcrowding, financial dependency, and overrepresentation of declining and 
low-value added industries.26 
 
c) Integrative 
 Differences in policy and administration across the border that hinder local cross-border co-operation (versus 
local domestic cooperation) in both public and private sectors.  
 Policy jurisdiction of local authority-led cross-border groups remains limited to planning and implementing 
externally-financed tourism and economic development initiatives.27 
 Not only are cross-border groups entirely dependent on EU INTERREG funding for operations, but the 
constraints of the UK’s post- 2007/8 austerity program have also left northern local authorities with shrinking 
resources from which to commit to these collaborative forum. 
3. Post-Brexit Vulnerability  
 In addition to rural subsidization, the EU has been particularly active in dispersing structural funding for cross-
border infrastructure projects and social programmes.  
 Endemic economic underdevelopment and peripherality mean that the border region is particularly vulnerable to 
effects of austerity in provision of public services, withdrawal of significant EU subsidization and loss of EU-
funding to infrastructural and community projects.  
 Devolved finance ministers meeting in Cardiff, July 2016 noted: ‘the potential economic impact on the border 
region in the North of Ireland, which has greatly benefited from European funding, is of particular concern’.28 
 
CROSS-BORDER ECONOMY 
1. Investment plans for cross-border integration 
 Significant cross-border dimension to the flood relief investment programme, and also in the energy and 
communications sectors, which already have high levels of cross-border integration. 
 Freedom of movement embodied in the plans for new Greenways and Blueways. 
 Irish government commitment: 
o Capital investment in health services and projects in the border region. 
o Commitment of €75m to A5 Western transport corridor. 
o €2.5m to North West Development Fund. 
2. EU Funds to 2014-2020 
 Around 10% of income to the community and voluntary sector comes from EU programmes (notwithstanding the 
difference made by the principles of additionality and matched funding, and EU-sponsored networks). 
 UK withdrawal from the EU would prevent Northern Ireland from accessing Horizon 2020 and subsequent EU 
R&D&I funding and could negatively affect its ability to improve its capacities in this area. 
UK/Ireland Border Priorities 
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EU Funding to N. Ireland 2014-202029  
European Regional Development Fund  308 million 
European Social Fund Programme  183 million 
INTERREG VA  240 million 
PEACE IV  229 million 
European Fisheries and Maritime Fund  24 million 
Rural Development Programme (CAP Pillar 2)  227 million 
CAP Pillar 1 2,299 million 
 
CRIME 
a) Partnership30 
 Joint Agency Task Force (Fresh Start Agreement): PSNI, An Garda Síochána, HM Revenue and Customs, the 
Revenue Commissioners. 
 Six priorities, inc. financial crime, excise fraud, human trafficking.  
 Actions of joint partnership approach include the deployment of targeted high visibility operational resources on 
both sides of the border, e.g. cross-border vehicle checkpoints, and overt/covert intelligence-led operations. 
 
b) Limits of Partnership 
 However, hot pursuits still end at the border, with one police force notifying the other when suspect crosses.  
o An Garda Síochána don’t keep data but according to PSNI, 47 incidents occurred between 2011-2015 (85% 
of time suspect is not apprehended).  
 EU precedent for facilitating the pursuit of criminals across borders (even outside Schengen Art 41), this has not 
been used by either force.31  
 The PSNI does not have a collaborative arrangement with An Garda Síochána (AGS) for service provision or 
policing arrangements.  
 The PSNI does have some joint information-sharing agreements in place with the AGS but formal collaboration, as 
seen in England and Wales, is legislatively not possible.32 
 
c) Connections to peace 
 While the bulk of the paramilitary groups engaged in the atrocities of the Troubles have since been demobilized 
and reduced to sporadic, isolated outbursts of violence, the most extreme elements of both sides continue to rely 
on black market and smuggling operations to finance their activities.33  
 An increase in demand and profitability of black market smuggling would provide ex-prisoners and at-risk youth on 
both sides with a powerful economic incentive to become increasingly engaged with the paramilitary groups 
already engaged in these types of operations.34  
 The economic disintegration of Ireland entailed in NI’s exit from the SEM is likely to increase the profitability of the 
smuggling operations conducted by Ireland’s remaining paramilitary organizations – increasing the likelihood of 
both black-market growth and related violence across the borderland region.  
 
ENERGY 
a) Single energy market35 
 The island of Ireland has had a common energy market (and single wholesale electricity market with voluntary 
harmonised retail arrangements) since 2007; Britain has a separate one. 
 Island of Ireland’s Single Electricity Market is underpinned by bilateral agreement. A joint regulatory committee 
implements EU regulation.  
 
b) Interdependence 
 Three undersea and one offshore pipeline between Ireland and GB; one north/south interconnector and a second 
North-South 400kV Interconnection Development in progress. 
 Ireland is a net importer of energy from Britain (95% of Ireland’s gas is imported); NI is a net importer of energy 
from ROI (insufficient local energy generation); Britain is a net importer of energy from the EU.  
 The imposition of tariffs on this energy supply would cause problems for both north and south.  
 
c) Vulnerabilities 
 Future interconnectors in the Republic are more likely to focus on France than GB/NI 
 Ireland’s energy market is currently being reformed to comply with EU Target Model, to facilitate more efficient 
trading with EU member states. 
 EU regulation currently ensures that UK has an emergency store of energy supplies that Ireland could draw 
upon. Could this be put at risk if UK no longer compliant?  
 If UK diverges from EU regulation on renewables and emissions reduction, this would cause greater distortion 
between the markets.   
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EU BORDER MANAGEMENT 
 
SECURITY UNION 
1. Strengthened borders  
 At the same time as the UK decides on whether it wants EU citizens to have freedom of movement, the EU is 
taking steps to clamp down on entry to its territory and monitoring of its borders.  
 The shared assumption in both moves is that abuses of the fundamental rights of those in EU countries and 
threats to internal security are integrally connected to population movement, especially inward migration. 
 The response of both the EU and the UK to this threat via and to state ‘borders’ is enhanced centralised powers 
of surveillance, restriction on movement of non-EU citizens, increased communication between states and 
agencies regarding individuals, and physical strengthening of state borders.  
2. New measures for the ‘Security Union’ announced by Juncker in September 2016: 
 The accelerated operational delivery of the European Border and Coast Guard 
o Built on Frontex, with the ability to draw on a reserve pool of 1500 border guards and technical equipment. 
o identifying and, where necessary, intervening to address weaknesses before they become serious problems.  
o Trumps national sovereignty in interest of the security union: “Crucially, if an EU country refuses to co-
operate with the new Agency to an extent that this puts the proper functioning of the Schengen zone into 
jeopardy, there will be a possibility for the other EU countries to reintroduce temporary border controls as a 
last resort”.36 
 Quick adoption and implementation of an EU Entry-Exit System (EES) (early 2020) 
o Together with a supporting amendment to the Schengen Borders Code, the EU Entry/Exit System (EES) is 
intended to ‘improve the management of the external borders, reduce irregular migration into the EU and 
ensure a high level of internal security’.  
o The system will collect data on travelers (identity, travel documents and biometrics) and will register entry and 
exit records at the point of crossing.  
o It will apply to all non-EU citizens who are admitted for a short stay in the Schengen area (maximum 90 days) 
 Proposals to create a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) 
o In advance of their travel to Schengen Area, gather information on third country nationals who don’t need a 
visa to assess whether they pose a risk for immigration or security.  
 Proposals to further enhance electronic document security and identity document management (e.g. identity cards) 
to prevent fraud 
 To strengthen Europol's recently created European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) 
o Together with the European Migrant Smuggling Centre and the European Cybercrime Centre, plus access to 
databases, Europol’s counter-terrorism capabilities and its work against migrant smuggling and cybercrime 
are strengthened. Idea of an information exchange hub to share information related to serious cross border 
security threats with law enforcement authorities in different states.   
 
3. Juxtaposed border system (as seen in Calais, established by the Le Touquet Agreement) represents the tactics 
available:  
 command and control centre to coordinate police/border force from both countries, monitor CCTV 
 5m high fence topped with razor wire and monitored by CCTV around the port and along motorway to port  
 electrified fences and CCTV protect train tracks and tunnels 
 heavily manned entrances where police in riot gear can physically check lorries  
 roving security patrols with dogs and monitors (heartbeat, carbon dioxide detectors) 
 immigration checkpoints at which passports are scanned  
 monitoring stops with capacity to x-ray and scan lorries (not physically possible to do each one at busy times), 
plus checking of documentation by border force  
 customs checkpoints 
 random checks on trains and vehicle checks once through to other side. 
 
UK/IRELAND BORDER MANAGEMENT 
 From 1921-1998 border enforcement policies ran the gambit from ‘hard’ enforcement (using customs 
checkpoints and roving patrols) to ‘extreme’, including the outright destruction of cross-border civil infrastructure 
by UK military forces during the 1970’s border campaign.37 
 The securitisation and militarisation of the Irish border – which continued until 2002 – worsened the consistent 
pattern of local social and political disintegration in the borderland region. 
 ‘Taking back control’ of maritime borders, reimposition of meridian lines, becomes problematic as soon as hit the 
Irish Sea.  
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SCENARIOS 
European Union
Pros: Receive funding from EU; 
Full access to single market; 
Influence and representation in EU 
institutions; EU members trade 
substantially more with other EU 
states than with members of the 
EEA or EFTA. 
Cons: Contribution to budget; 
Compliance with laws, regulations, 
rules, enforcement.
European Economic Area
Pros: Access to single market; 
Reduced contribution to budget; 
Separate fisheries agreement; No 
CAP; Autonomous adaptation of EU 
law.
Cons: Contributes to EU budget (exc 
CAP); Complies with acquis 
communautaire for access to the 
single market; Upholds the Four 
Freedoms so integrates all EU 
legislation relating to Single Market; 
Consulted on EU legisation but limited 
influence; Guillotine clause limits 
cherry picking; Free movement but 
citizens have to apply for residency 
permits in EU MS; No restriction on 
family reunion for EU citizens; Large 
public administration growth to 
manage.
European Free Trade Area
Pros: No required contribution to 
EU budget; No compliance with 
CAP rules; Freedom to set own 
tariff rules and independent trade 
deals. 
Cons: Wide range of sectoral 
agreements to be negotiated; 
Budgetary contribution for 
involvement in aspects of EU, such 
as research; Need to adopt 
equivalent regulations to gain 
access to single market; Need to 
accept new EU regulations as 
emerge without means of shaping 
them; Guillotine clause (all or none) 
limits cherry picking; Mirror 
institutions to the EU (CoJ, 
Commission).
World Trade Organisation  
(Most Favoured Nation status)
Pros: Purely trade based rules; No 
contribution to budget; EU must comply 
with WTO rules.
Cons: Must still comply with EU 
environmental rules and regulations to 
access single market; Extraordinarily 
complicated tariff lines; No influence over 
EU rules
Free Trade Agreement
Pros: No compliance with rules or 
laws; No contribution to budget.
Cons: No formal consultation or 
influence on EU; Some shared 
obligations and standards needed 
for access to single market; Tariffs 
apply except where negotiated.
Customs Union 
Pros: No tariffs on goods trade; 
Control over immigration policy; 
No contribution to EU budget. 
Cons: Product market 
regulatory harmonisation; Must 
adopt Common External Tariff; 
No authority to negotiate trade 
deals with third party countries.  
 
Overseas Territories status 
(for NI?) 
Pros: Channel Islands and Isle of 
Man not part of EU or UK; Article 
355(5)(c) and Protocol 3 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
enables them to be part of the EU 
customs territory.  
Cons: Voluntary implementation of 
appropriate EU legislation or 
application of the international 
standards on which they are based. 
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SOFT BREXIT BORDER REGIME 
1. Governance 
 Minor revision of the GFA and the NI Act  
 Still some purging of devolved legislation from compliance with EU law 
 Less internal threat to the status quo of local devolved governance 
 Will require additional public administration (as will all options) 
 Retention of Strand 2 and Strand 3 institutions which can still help to ensure compliance with EU legislation 
 No access to EU decision-making, though adherence to (future) EU policies. 
2. Flows 
a) SEM 
 Retains access to the single market and free movement of goods, services, capital and people  
 Ireland and UK could even join Schengen and thus enable freedom of movement, but would still require customs 
controls 
 Some customs control and requirement for proof of goods origin needed at borders 
 Minimal impediment to trade (import/export) between NI and ROI 
 Keeps the level of migrant worker contribution to NI economy 
 Contributions to EU budget (albeit reduced) will continue (to come from devolved or central budget?).  
 
b) EU Funding 
 Continued access to EU structural funds (ERDF, ESF), INTERREG, and to subsidies through CAP 
 Financial commitment from UK/Irish governments to contribute to EU programmes. 
 
c) Cross-border 
 There are mechanisms which could see cross-border co-operation within EU funding Programmes with one 
partner outside EU (e.g. INTERREG VA Sweden-Finland-Norway (Nord Programme) or the Italy-Switzerland 
Programme model)38  
 Ease of continuing cross-border co-operation as is because of potentially less legislative and policy divergence 
between NI and ROI. 
 
3. Citizenship 
- Free movement of people retained (if EEA); citizens’ rights to live, reside and work retained (possibly some 
reform in light of Cameron’s deal) 
- Fewer rights of British citizens in EU 
- Equality legislation: retained but what might the effect of a repeal of the 1998 Human Rights Act (and its 
replacement with a Bill of Rights) entail for UK, EU and non-EU/UK citizens? 
- Continued access to funding such as Horizon2020, benefitting research and development 
- No immediate impact on social deprivation, particularly on the border region 
- No major prompt for change in identity and border poll preferences. 
 
4. Security 
 Full integration into EU systems of policing and security intelligence 
 Will require minimal border controls/checks on land and sea borders, notwithstanding strengthened capacity of 
EU to monitor movement etc  
 Continued access to PEACE funding and support for border region projects 
 No big changes in the status quo of political preferences and voting behavior. 
 
SOFT BREXIT 
 
Pros 
• Less (immediate) change to internal political divisions/alliances 
• No major party in Northern Ireland wants to see the re-imposition of a hard border on the island 
• Implications for trade north/south and east/west 
Cons 
• For pro-Brexit unionists: Strain on the integrity of the Union due to continued compliance with EU law and the 
four freedoms? 
• Less control over EU policymaking 
• More interest in FDI going to Ireland? 
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ELASTIC BREXIT 
1. Governance 
 Differentiated futures with(in) the EU for devolved regions 
a) Bespoke arrangement for NI agreed in negotiation with the EU and the UK (and Ireland?), such as: 
 NI remains in EU but others leave 
 Or UK remains (inc NI/Scotland) and England/Wales leave (would require devolved competency) 
 New status for NI as overseas territory 
 New status for NI as member of the customs union. 
 
b) Reconfiguration of state of Ireland 
 Possibility of federation 
 But Northern Ireland can only ‘choose’ Irish unification; other forms of association with Ireland would require 
British government approval 
 Ireland could join Schengen Area.39 
 
c) Differentiated treatment of different aspects of the four freedoms 
 Hard borders for people and soft for goods, capital, services 
 Or gradients of ‘hardness’ for different groups of citizens (exists already to some extent), along lines of work 
permits and skills rather than nationality 
 Or quotas. 
2. Flows 
 Decisions around which types of freedoms and border controls and where they should be imposed would reflect 
priorities of the British government and EU Commission. 
 
3. Citizenship 
 Possibility of special status for NI (and other devolved region) residents for freedom of movement within these 
islands. 
 ‘With the protections that the CTA has enjoyed under Protocol 20 to the EU treaties no longer operative in the 
event of Brexit, Ireland will likely face legal and political pressure not to extend more favourable movement 
arrangements to UK citizens than it does to EU citizens.’40 
4. Security 
 Depending on the makeup, will require adjustments to border controls and possibly delineation of different types 
of borders within these islands (already exists to some extent). 
 
HARD BREXIT 
1. Governance 
 Devolution statutes purged from the requirements to comply with EU legislation; 
 Possibly retaining the same degree of freedom of movement across the Irish border for Irish and UK citizens 
(following a renegotiation of the CTA) but stricter border controls for other EU, and especially non-EU, nationals 
 How will Equality legislation be redrawn? 
 Barriers emerging to cross-border co-operation, relating to greater legislative and policy diversions between NI 
and ROI. More pronounced in some areas than in others. 
ELASTIC BREXIT  
 
Pros 
• Secures future of the UK for medium term by giving recognition of different needs and interests of devolved 
regions (undermining momentum for independence) 
• Addresses cross-border concerns and particular needs of Irish border regime and border region  
 
Cons 
• Highly complex negotiations 
• Complex institutional and constitutional redrawing  
• Irish government will need to be incorporated as an interested party (mechanism for this?) 
• Unionists may fear risk of further differentiation within the Union and present it as a sop to nationalist/Remain 
interests 
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2. Flows 
a) Trade  
 If no access to the single marker or membership of the customs union is sought/negotiated then a variety of 
options exist (e.g. achieving the status of a MFN and trading under WTO rules) 
 In passing through an external EU border the approximately 35% of Northern Irish exports (55% of manufactured 
exports) currently destined for southern markets would be exposed to a significant competitive disadvantage 
relative to EU-produced goods.41 This is particularly true for the agricultural goods produced in the rural 
borderland areas, which have seen exports of animal products to the south drive recent economic growth.42 
b) Cross-Border 
 Cross-border cooperation is still possible but would require both the political will and provision of financial means.  
 It would also entail agreement with EU as negotiation between EU and non-EU member-state across an EU 
external border. 
c)  EU funding 
 Participation in EU programmes ‘would need the consent of the UK Government, which would have to negotiate 
with the EU on Northern Ireland’s behalf and determine whether the necessary financial contributions would 
come from the central government’s budget or from the devolved budget’.43 
d) Border region 
 Negative economic effect on the border region due to loss of EU funding, especially the ERDF; 
 Loss of funding through Horizon 2020 and subsequent EU R&D&I funding. Possible negative effect on ability to 
improve its capacities in this area. 
3. Citizenship 
 Until a visa- waiver scheme is negotiated following Brexit, UK citizens will have to adopt a “pay as you go” 
approach to traveling to EU countries, completing the necessary entry requirements to enable them to travel.44 
 Impact, through loss of funding, on the community and voluntary sector, which in Northern Ireland plays an 
important role in addressing social and economic deprivation, training and employment, social enterprise, health 
and well-being, ‘peace building’ and building cross-community and cross-border relationships 
 Rising applications for Irish/EU passports? Gradual identity change? 
 Possible reduction of seasonal migrant and cross-border workers 
 Although migration and passport controls can still be coordinated bilaterally if Ireland is not in Schengen, thus 
allowing freedom of movement across UK/Ireland borders the inability to distinguish between business and 
personal travel may cause problems from EU point of view as now an EU external border.  
4. Security 
 A ‘hard’ EU external border would either run through the island or between these islands (depending on 
renegotiation of CTA). Border controls, delays at points of entry. 
 The price distortions created by a northern exit of the SEM present both a financial and security challenge to 
policy-makers on both sides of the border. Financially, returning to a disintegrated market would revive the same 
incentive for black market growth that fuelled smuggling operations across the border prior to EEC accession. 
 An increase in demand and profitability of black market smuggling would provide ex-prisoners and at-risk youth 
on both sides with a powerful economic incentive to become increasingly engaged with the paramilitary groups 
already engaged in these types of operations (Secretary of State, 2015). 
 What will the social effects of a hardening of the border be in terms of public acceptance and opinion, and 
change in political preferences? 
 Loss of PEACE IV funding, targeted at groups most vulnerable to conflict legacy (e.g. ex-prisoners, young 
people, NEETS), would have a detrimental effect on process of reconciliation and stability.  
HARD BREXIT 
 
Pros 
• Addresses primary EU-focused concerns of Leave voters 
• Greater control over immigration 
• Clean break, rewriting rules 
Cons 
• Most economic models predict that this will result in greatest trade destruction (the UK’s and NI’s largest single 
trade partner) due to reduced integration with EU policies  
 Expected reduction in bilateral trade flows between NI and ROI 
 Likely to cost the UK economy more than is gained from lower contributions to the EU budget;  
 Stresses on the Union because of imposing overall will on the wishes of different constituent parts; 
 Although policy differentiation between the UK’s devolved regions may not increase, differential impact of Brexit 
on economic and political conditions is likely  
 The growth of price distortions and resulting black market growth would undermine both consumption tax and 
import revenues collected by both states.  
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DISCUSSION POINTS 
Priorities 
A. 
ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES 
Key Points 
 Northern Ireland exhibits structural fiscal vulnerability because of elevated fiscal deficit and lack of control over 
revenue sources. 
 Numerous reports suggest that Northern Ireland may suffer greater economic loss as a result of Brexit, relative to 
the UK as a whole. 
 Concern across political spectrum with this question (and in devolved regions, see Cardiff statement). 
 It is notable that the economic strategy of the Northern Ireland Executive is to attract FDI, following ROI model, 
which requires access to EU market.  
 Fiscal vulnerability affects sustainability of public services, with amplified effects on the border region. 
Questions  
i. Would any changes to existing free trade arrangements affect all trade or only certain sectors?  
 Is there scope for sectoral and importer-country-specific tariff free trade (e.g. agri-food to south)? (Leadsom’s 
speech on 3rd Oct seems to imply this is so). 
ii. How far might trade agreements with alternative trade regimes (e.g. European Free Trade Association, North 
Atlantic Free Trade Agreement) provide significant opportunities for growth in trade for Northern Ireland? 
iii. EU Funding 2014-2020 3.5bn – what substitutes for this and which budget will they come from?  
 Leadsom’s speech indicates government support for CAP up to 2020.  
iv. Is continued access to EU structural funds and peace funding possible, especially if leave the EEA? Under what 
conditions? How can this be negotiated? Will the Irish and UK governments have the capacity and willingness to 
commit similar levels of financial support? 
 
B. 
CITIZENSHIP 
Key Points 
 Much anticipated new NI Racial Equality Strategy framed within EU law.  
 Immigration, including asylum, free movement of persons within the European Economic Area; issue of travel 
documents are all excepted matters under Schedule 2 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. This means that it is for 
Westminster to decide policy on these matters. 
 Duncan Smith report (Sept 2016): wanting work permit system to control who, how many and what work. Want 
light touch on high skilled and restrictions on low skilled labour. In-migration figures from EU citizens as seasonal 
workers are often not counted because they stay for less than a year. 
Questions 
i. How will repeal of the Human Rights act affect equality legislation in Northern Ireland? 
ii. Specifically, how will the rights of each EU, non-EU and non-UK/EU citizens be affected? 
iii. How will the (technically separate but related) process of replacing the Human Rights Act (1998) with a Bill of 
Rights resonate with, and affect, existing devolved (rights and equality) legislation? 
o What political consensus/discord could develop around this issue? 
iv. What are the particular implications and problems for this case given 1/5 of residents in NI are Irish citizens, and 
all have the potential to be Irish citizens? 
v. Is there a case for Northern Ireland pressing for EU workers currently resident in Northern Ireland to have their 
current rights recognized and upheld in after Brexit?; Could there be a political agreement on this issue. 
 
C.  
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 
Key Points 
 The post-Brexit future of the CTA is not dependent on negotiations between the UK and Ireland but on UK - EU 
agreement.  
 It is understood that according to EU law Ireland (as a EU member) is not competent to negotiate on the future of 
the CTA by itself as a country. 
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 At the same time as the UK decides on whether it wants EU citizens to have freedom of movement, the EU is 
taking steps to clamp down on entry to its territory and monitoring of its borders.  
 The Republic of Ireland’s borders with the UK are unlikely to be subject to the same measures as the EU’s 
external borders because those are contingent on protecting the Schengen area. There are no plans as yet for 
Ireland to join Schengen. There is scope, therefore, for Ireland/UK negotiation on border security as part of CTA. 
Questions 
i. Common Travel Area 
o To what extent can a CTA agreement secure a ‘free-flowing’ border and for whom?  
o How will the necessity to differentiate between the movement of non-Irish EU, Irish EU, UK and other non-EU 
and non-UK citizens be satisfied, without the appearance of a ‘hard border’? Can it? 
ii. Cross-border workers 
o What will be the impact of restrictions on cross-border workers on the island of Ireland? 
o What will the effect of restrictions be on local employment and economic activity in border areas? 
o What does a new more restrictive immigration policy mean for employers, particularly those reliant on 
seasonal migrant labour?   
 
D.  
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 
Key Points 
 North/South policy alignment areas (agriculture/rural development, education, the natural environment, 
healthcare, tourism, and transportation) reflect EU priority areas. 
 All parties and both governments want to see a continuation of freedom of movement of trade, services and 
people on the island.  
Questions 
i. EU Funding: 
o What political and legal mechanisms would be needed to maintain support for cross-border programmes, 
to replace PEACE/INTERREG? 
o What practical considerations are needed for delivery and governance of the current PEACE IV and 
INTERREG VA Programmes when the UK leaves the EU i.e. financial flows, accountability arrangements, 
recouping of Irish ERDF and adherence to EU regulations?  
o Prospects for negotiating continued access to EU funds? 
o Effects of loss of EU funding on the Voluntary and Community sector and in infrastructure and border 
region. What are the wider implications of losing support for civil society organisations? 
ii. In the absence of a shared EU policy/framework directive, what will be the approach adopted on a cross-border 
basis (between EU and NI) to meet environmental targets in such fields as water quality, marine management, 
habitat protection and development of priority species?  
o Leadsom’s speech implies writing-in of environmental directives but also scope to make policies that meet 
particular national needs and environment. Will capacity be devolved for this given that environmental 
needs may be seen to differ within the UK? 
 
E. 
PEACE 
Key Points 
 Commentators have highlighted the danger implied in a Brexit-related revision of the Good Friday Agreement.  
 Break up of stable balance of these isles (UK or Irish fragmentation) has implications for political and popular 
positions. 
 GFA is a legal framework holds together a lack of political consensus. Problem here is not legal as such but 
political, social and cultural – how much trust is there?  
 Risk of worsening cross-border criminal activity linked to paramilitarism.  
Questions 
i. By unpicking the thread of the GFA is there a risk of other elements becoming unraveled?  Could open up 
questions that there is no political or social agreement. 
ii. How will Strand II (dealing with North-South relations) and Strand III (dealing with inter-governmental relations) 
be affected?  
iii. Could reviewing the CTA and the GFA lead to unpicking of political relationship and exacerbation of political 
divisions in the case of Northern Ireland? 
 
Discussion Points 
 
2
0
 
Possibilities 
F. 
PROSPECTS FOR COMMON NORTHERN IRELAND POSITION IN UK NEGOTIATIONS 
Key Points 
 PM has reassured that Northern Ireland will be ‘fully involved and represented in negotiations’ and that border 
will not become an ‘impediment to movement of goods, services and people.’ 
 Given the standoff about the budget and welfare reform that was only resolved with British and Irish Government 
intervention, the risks of NI not being able to put forward a strong position are exacerbated.  
 There is significant divergence of political discourse and positions on Brexit both (a) between Northern Ireland 
and British government and (b) within Northern Ireland. 
 Within the NI Executive, Sinn Féin and the DUP campaigned in different directions in the referendum, but there 
are differences within these parties, particularly among their support bases. This raises new prospects of 
vulnerability for the leadership of the main parties. 
 Northern Ireland position needs to be made clear on at least three fronts: 
o (a) exit of EU (and status of external borders of EU on the island of Ireland) 
o (b) renegotiation of Common Travel Area,  
o (c) fiscal draw down from the Exchequer post-Brexit (e.g. compensating for loss of EU funds). 
Questions 
i. Is there a necessity for agreeing a common position within Northern Ireland with respect to representation of its 
interests in the exiting negotiations?  
ii. How divisive, in political and social terms, has the Referendum been and how divisive/uniting will the process of 
attempting to come up with a common negotiating position for exit, and the consequent new legislation, be? 
o Does it have to be founded on positive positions rather than vulnerabilities/ fears (e.g. economic risk)? 
o What issues must the common position cover, and to what extent? 
iii. Does representation have to be in relation to all matters or select ones (e.g. EU funding, CAP)? 
iv. What are the precedents of devolved administrations gaining meaningful representation in such negotiations?  
G. 
UK/IRELAND RELATIONS 
Key Points 
 The Irish government estimates reduction in bilateral trade flows between the UK and Ireland of around 20% 
post-Brexit. 
 Reactions to the all-Ireland forum indicate persistent political sensitivities regarding Irish government involvement 
in ‘UK matters’. 
Questions 
i. How willing would the ROI be to also renegotiate status with the EU, given that otherwise Strand 2 and Strand 3 
relationships would no longer be bilateral but EU/non-EU? 
ii. Might the EU be willing to risk the hit to the ROI if hold hard negotiating line regarding the four freedoms and thus 
nudge UK government towards hard Brexit? 
iii. Will the Irish and UK governments have the capacity and willingness to commit similar levels of financial support to 
Northern Ireland post-Brexit? 
 
H. 
GOVERNANCE 
Key Points 
 All devolution statutes include strict requirements to comply with EU legislation. If the Repeal Bill is implemented, 
who is competent to decide at the devolved level what laws will remain and which will change? 
 The Sewell convention ensures that UK government will not normally legislate on a devolved matter without the 
consent of the devolved legislature.45 
 NI has benefit of several different institutions to represent its interests: 
o  (a) Assembly to ensure effective coordination and input by Ministers to national policy-making, including on 
EU issues;  
o (b) NSMC to ensure coordination on cross-sectoral issues inc EU; 
o (c) NSMC views to be represented at EU level; 
o (d) BIC to discuss EU affairs. What role is there for these? 
Discussion Points 
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Questions 
i. How can consent be given to Brexit from NI? 
o Would the devolved assembly have to give legislative consent to the UK-wide withdrawal agreement? 
o How will the Assembly vote, given the divisive nature of the issue and what political fractures will be exposed 
and widened? 
ii. What needs to change in NI in particular? 
o Will EU exit mean there will have to be a redrawing of the GFA and all associated legal acts? 
 Is there a new role for strand 3 institutions, or the Joint Ministerial Council? 
iii. Could there be a role for local cross-border institutions in overseeing and facilitating cross-border cooperation 
and policy coordination post-Brexit? What would this require? 
I. 
ELASTIC BREXIT? 
Key Points 
 UK needs to ‘get own house in order’ before triggering Article 50. 
 Independence/’devo max’ solutions are likely to be problematic. In Scotland 45% voted for independence (with 
62% saying Scottish only and 8% British only identity). In NI around 25% consistently say Irish reunification is their 
preference (a figure which has not risen greatly since the referendum result) and census results indicate 40% 
British only identity).  
 Divergence between a deal with the EU that would be in the best interests of the UK government and that in the 
interests of Northern Ireland. 
 All protagonists want to see a continuation of freedom of movement of trade, services and people on the island 
 Differential layers of ‘border regime’ already exist within these isles and the EU. 
 Imagination needed with regards to conceiving arrangements that recognise needs and differences within the 
regions of the UK vis-à-vis the EU.  
Questions 
i. Can the principle of freedom of movement that is shared across these islands be the basis for a joint Executive 
position on negotiating a bespoke arrangement? 
ii. What unique status of Northern Ireland could politicians agree on that compromises neither unionist nor 
nationalist political credibility? 
iii. What flexibility will be possible from the UK and the EU vis a vis the status of Northern Ireland as a region? 
iv. What mechanisms are there for representing the range of main players in NI? 
o Could the NSMC serve as a platform for the Northern Ireland Executive to contribute to UK/EU policy making 
with respect to a bespoke arrangement for Northern Ireland? 
o What potential role can GFA Strand 3 institutions have in this respect? 
o Is there space for formal input from the Irish government? 
 
J. 
BORDER MANAGEMENT 
Key Points 
 The Republic of Ireland’s borders with the UK are unlikely to be subject to the same measures as the EU’s 
external borders because those are contingent on protecting the Schengen area. There are no plans as yet for 
Ireland to join Schengen. There is scope, therefore, for Ireland/UK negotiation on border security as part of 
Common Travel Area. 
 The Le Touquet Agreement would no doubt be revisited.  
 There is clear room for further cooperation between policing and customs agencies on the island of Ireland; 
would UK non-membership of the EU be an impediment here? 
Questions 
i. Will the ‘hard border’ be a land or sea border?  
o Would the sea border as an external border of the EU make a difference in practice for UK/Ireland relations? 
ii. What are the various options for a ‘hard border’ in terms of security/management? 
o What would this look like in practice? 
iii. The national question – how willing would the ROI be to engage in a different relationship with the North? 
iv. What difference would UK non-membership of the EU make to sharing of intelligence and information and 
cooperation regarding border security? 
v. What lessons to be learnt from the hard customs and security border already experienced on the island? 
o How different might this look today? 
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